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Abstract 
The growing importance of economic factors in farmers’ decision to go organic has raised 
interest in characterizing the economic behavior of organic versus conventional farms. 
Published analyses so far have not considered differential uncertainties and farmers’ risk 
preferences between conventional and organic practices when comparing these techniques. 
Our article attempts to assess this issue. We use a model of farmer decision under risk to 
analyze the differential values between Spanish COP organic and conventional farms and to 
assess the incentives for adoption of organic practices. Results show that organic and 
conventional farms do have different abilities to control production risk as well as different 
risk preferences. Organic price premiums and subsidies are found to be powerful instruments 
to motivate adoption of organic techniques. 
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Introduction 
While in the early days the organic sector’s evolution was mainly supply driven, more 
recently, consumers have become the most relevant driving force. Since the 1990s, 
organic produce sales have soared in developed countries as consumer confidence in agri-
industrial foods has eroded as a result of a series of food scares (mad cow disease, E-coli, 
avian influenza), proliferating pharmaceuticals and genetically modified organisms in 
food production, as well as consumer concerns about environmental issues (Rigby, 
Young, and Burton 2001; Thompson 1998). In 2003, the European Union (EU) 
accounted for half of worldwide organic food retail sales (Dimitri and Oberholtzer 2006). 
The United States accounted for almost the other half of the global market. The growing 
social interest in organic farming has led many countries, specially EU counties, to 
provide financial help to conversion representing another motivation to shift from 
conventional to organic farming. A further incentive to conversion has been the crisis in 
large sectors of the conventional farming industry, which has motivated farmers to look 
for alternatives to stay in the sector (Rigby, Young, and Burton 2001).  
The reasons that motivate farmers to convert to organic methods have been 
thoroughly studied in the literature. Published research has identified several relevant 
characteristics that stimulate farmers to go organic and that differentiate them from 
conventional growers. While early adopters seem to have been mainly driven by non-
economic motivations such as different personal attitudes and lifestyle, the determinants 
of adoption have fundamentally changed over time, with economic factors gaining more 
relevance (Lohr and Salomonsson 2000). Understanding the economic behavior of both 
organic and conventional farmers is thus important to better characterize these two      3
groups and to improve the understanding that we have on adoption decisions. A literature 
review (see next section) suggests that published analyses so far have not considered 
differential uncertainties and farmers’ risk preferences between conventional and organic 
practices. The switch from conventional to organic farming is likely to entail a change in 
output variability (as well as in output mean) caused by a change in management 
techniques and input use. Also, to the extent that profit mean and variance differ among 
organic and conventional farms, farmers’ risk preferences may be key to understanding 
economic behavior.  
Our article attempts to assess this issue. Specifically, we aim to characterize 
organic and conventional farms’ production technologies under risk, by using flexible 
production function specifications that allow the impacts of inputs on the output mean to 
differ from their effects on the stochastic element of production. To do so, we use data 
from a sample of Spanish farms specialized in the production of arable crops. After 
characterizing production, we assess organic and conventional farmers’ risk preferences. 
Given the differences between organic and conventional farms and farmers, we expect to 
find different attitudes towards risk. Finally, we assess farmers’ decision to adopt organic 
farming by conducting a simulation exercise that compares the expected utility under 
each alternative and different economic scenarios. Results are compared to adoption 
patterns that would result from a risk-neutral scenario. As noted, previous research has 
neither allowed for differential uncertainties nor for risk attitudes in conventional and 
organic practices, which is the main novelty of our work. 
Our article is organized as follows. The next section reviews both the history of 
organic farming and previous literature on the differences between organic and      4
conventional farms as well as on the motivations to adopt organic farming techniques. 
The methods section discusses the methodology employed in the analysis. The Spanish 
organic agriculture is described thereafter. Details of the dataset used are presented in the 
empirical application section, where research results are also offered. We devote the last 
section of our article to the concluding remarks. 
Organic Versus Conventional Farms: A Literature Review 
A unique feature of the 20th century was intensification of agriculture, which included 
increased reliance on synthetic chemicals. The two watershed events were the discovery 
of the Haber-Bosch process to fix nitrogen (Haber received the Nobel Price in 1918), and 
the introduction of synthetic pesticides in the 1930s (and, in particular, DDT in the 
1940s). Some of the industrial capacity developed during World War II was converted to 
production of agricultural chemicals after the war, leading to widespread adoption. The 
green revolution, an international campaign to improve agricultural productivity, resulted 
in many high-yield varieties that drastically enhanced output per acre, but thrived on 
chemical inputs. As Huffman and Evenson (1993) emphasize, most of the green 
revolution varieties were introduced in the developing countries using technologies from 
the developed nations. Nobel laureate Norman Bourlaug played a key role in introducing 
high-yield wheat varieties that contributed to mitigating world famine. Bourlaug's work 
was supported by cooperation between the Mexican government and the Rockefeller 
Foundation. The important increases in agricultural yields as a result of intensification 
were especially relevant in developing countries (Huffman and Evenson 1993).  
The organic movement, which was originated by Sir Albert Howard and 
popularized by J. I. Rodale, presented an alternative to mainstream intensification relying      5
on synthetic chemicals. This alternative approach gained momentum with the publication 
of Silent Spring by Rachel Carson (1962). The organic movement broadened its scope in 
the 1960s and 1970s to embrace the relationship between agriculture and resource 
conservation (Klonsky and Tourte 1998). The increase in oil prices in 1973 and 1974 
evidenced the vulnerability of food production and farm income to energy shortages and 
price fluctuations, further increasing interest in organic agriculture (Klepper et al., 1977). 
Also, the removal in the 1970s of some pesticides from the market to forestall 
environmental damage, such as the DDT banning by the U. S. government, stimulated 
alternative systems of food production. Increased interest in organic agriculture led to 
increased pressure for government regulation both by farming and consumer groups. 
Governments in developed countries responded by providing organic food and 
certification standards, especially during the 1990s.
1 
The increasing interest in organic farming techniques has produced a number of 
scholarly articles that assess the differences between organic and conventional farms, as 
well as the decision to adopt. A number of these studies have collected farm-level data by 
surveying agricultural holdings and have qualitatively analyzed these data (Lampkin 
1994; Freyer, Rantzau, and Vogtmann 1994; Fairweather and Campbell 1996; 
Fairweather 1999). There have also been a number of statistical approaches to address the 
issue of adoption of new technologies. These analyses can be classified into three main 
groups (Rigby, Young, and Burton 2001). A first group is composed of bivariate analyses 
measuring adoption at a certain point in time (Lohr and Salomonsson 2000; or Burton, 
Rigby, and Young 1999). A second avenue integrates diffusion analyses that address the 
aggregate cumulative adoption rate of a new technology (Feder, Just, and Zilberman      6
1985). A third group of studies comprises of duration analyses that explain how long it 
takes a farmer to adopt a particular technology (Burton, Rigby, and Young 2003). 
  Published research has identified several relevant characteristics that influence 
adoption. As mentioned, these characteristics range from noneconomic to economic 
factors. Among the noneconomic factors, it is worth mentioning farmers’ personal 
characteristics (organic farmers have been typically found to be better educated and 
younger relative to conventional growers), personal attitudes, lifestyle choices, concerns 
about health and the environment, access to technical and financial information on 
organic farming, geographical issues (a critical mass of organic producers has been found 
to be a powerful requirement to overcome information and isolation inconveniences), and 
farm structural characteristics (organic farms are usually smaller and appear to be more 
diversified relative to conventional ones).  
Economic factors such as the availability of sales outlets, public subsidies, 
transition costs, or organic produce price premiums are also crucial to understand 
adoption processes. As noted, these economic factors have gained relevance over time. 
Rigby, Young, and Burton (2001) attribute these changes to two main developments in 
the agricultural sector in the late 1990s. First, the above-mentioned food scares and social 
concerns about environmental degradation caused by agriculture, which have led to a 
dramatic increase in the demand for organic produce. Second, and as also noted, the 
economic crisis affecting large sectors of conventional agriculture has motivated farmers 
to look for alternative strategies to stay in business. In light of the changes in the 
motivation to go organic, some more recent analyses have focused their attention 
exclusively on the economic determinants of adoption (Pietola and Oude Lansink 2001).      7
Of interest is also the paper by Oude Lansink and Jensma (2003), which compares the 
economic performance of Dutch organic versus conventional farms using a risk-neutral 
profit maximization approach. As noted in the introduction section, in spite of the shift in 
interest towards differentiating organic and conventional farms based on economic 
variables, previous studies have not considered differential risk preferences and 
uncertainties between the two groups. We aim at characterizing the economic 
performance of organic versus conventional farms by allowing for different risk and 
attitudes towards this risk, which constitutes the main novelty of our article. 
The literature has provided evidence that risk considerations affect agricultural 
input use and technology adoption both in developing countries (see, for example, Just 
and Zilberman 1983; Feder, Just, and Zilberman 1985; Kebede 1992; or Byerlee and 
Hesse de Polanco 1986) and in developed countries (see Brink and McCarl 1978; Marra 
and Carlson 1990; Just and Pope 2002). Just and Pope (1978) establish that production 
technologies can affect both the mean and risk of yields, and thus profits, and distinguish 
between inputs that are risk reducing and risk increasing. Let’s assume, for example, that 
synthetic pesticides contribute to reducing output variability by raising agricultural 
production in unfavorable states of nature (Horowitz and Lichtenberg 1994). Because 
organic practices involve a reduction in the use of synthetic inputs such as pesticides, the 
shift from conventional to organic methods could alter production risk. For example, if 
organic pesticides are less capable of controlling pest populations, output variability may 
increase. Our analysis will allow for such differences. There is also plenty of evidence 
that farmers are not likely to be neutral to risk and tend to be risk averse (Antle 1987; 
Chavas and Holt 1990; Bar-Shira, Just, and Zilberman 1997; Hennessy 1998; Just and      8
Pope 2002; Serra et al. 2006; Isik and Khanna 2003; Saha 1997). The role of risk and risk 
aversion in the adoption and evaluation of innovations varies across technologies and has 
not been sufficiently investigated for some recent farming methods (Marra, Pannell, and 
Abadi Ghadim 2003). Because of the supposed impacts of organic farming practices, an 
analysis of these methods should investigate their yield risk effects, and an attempt to 
understand their adoption should also investigate farmers’ risk preferences.  
Methods 
The Theoretical Model 
The aim of our research is to allow for uncertainty and risk preferences in assessing the 
value of organic practices relative to conventional ones. To do so, we will consider a 
farm with a fixed amount of land  A. The farmer can either produce under conventional 
or organic methods represented by superscripts C  and O, respectively. It is assumed that 
production is characterized by constant returns to scale. Farms’ per hectare production 
function with heteroskedastic error structure is represented by 
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O. This is very likely to cause differences in the value that 
farmers attribute to each technology, which we measure using a utility function. It is 
assumed that producers take their decisions with the aim of maximizing the expected 
utility of their wealth: max
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function,  W
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a per hectare basis,  p
I is the output market price with mean  p
I  and standard deviation 
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subsidies. Following Meyer (1987), we assume that economic agents’ optimal decision 
involves ranking different alternatives by using a utility function defined over the mean 
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I , which is positive under risk aversion.      10
Decreasing (constant) [increasing] absolute risk aversion can be represented by 
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A conventional farmer will consider going organic if: V
O >V
C, i.e., if the utility 
that she would obtain from organic practices is superior to the one arising from 
conventional ones. Hence, not only differential expected profit but also differential profit 
variability will be key in comparing the value of the two alternatives. In this regard, and 
contrary to what would happen in a risk-neutral scenario, organic produce price 
premiums will have two opposite impacts on farmers’ value of organic practices. On the 
one hand, higher prices will increase utility levels by increasing expected wealth 











⎠ ⎟ , but on the other they will reduce utility through an increase in 
wealth risk 












⎟ . The trade-off between mean and variance will be 
weighted by farmers. Their risk preferences will be key in such consideration. 
Conversely, in a risk-neutral scenario only the first impact would be effective 











⎠ ⎟ . Also, under our framework, differential abilities to control output 
risk through input use will be important to understand producer decisions. Production 
technologies generating higher expected yields with lower variability will be preferred by 
risk-averse farmers. By assuming an internal solution, x
I > 0, the first-order conditions 












I = 0 with 
   j =1,.., J , which leads to the following expression:      11







































This expression shows that the impact of price and output uncertainty on risk preferences 
arises from the existence of a marginal risk premium (MP) that is equivalent to the 
distance between the variable input expected marginal income and its unit cost, i.e., 
































Our theoretical model provides a tool to compare the performance of organic 
versus conventional farms, but does not allow for anticipating the differences between the 
two groups. These differences will depend on several issues such as the magnitude of the 
impact of organic price premiums on wealth mean and variance, the changes in 
production costs as a result of adopting organic farming practices, etc. Let’s assume, for 
example, that organic produce price premiums have a stronger impact on expected wealth 
than they do on wealth variability. Also, suppose that organic farms use conventional 
farming-equivalent inputs. Manure, for example, can replace synthetic fertilizers, while 
mechanical methods could substitute for synthetic pesticides. A change in inputs is likely 
to involve a change in production costs. For instance, organic methods may require more 
labor relative to conventional farms, which could raise unit costs. If the organic price 
premium were bigger than the increase in unit production costs, conversion to organic 
farming would cause unit profits to grow. Under such circumstances, and assuming no 
binding physical constraints, it is reasonable to expect an increase in input use leading to 
organic yields higher than conventional ones.
3 On the other hand, organic price premiums 
may not be enough to compensate the increase in organic production costs. In such 
situations, one should expect a decline in input use by organic farms as well as in yields.      12
As noted and since production technologies, risk preferences, price premiums, and costs 
may differ across crops and geographical areas, the differences between organic and 
conventional practices cannot be anticipated by theory and can only be determined by 
empirical investigation. 
Empirical Specification 
Different functional forms for both the output mean and variance were considered. We 
used Pollack and Wales’ (1991) likelihood dominance criterion as well as the Akaike 
information criterion of model selection to choose among them. The Cobb-Douglas form 
was found to dominate other more flexible specifications such as the quadratic for both 
organic and conventional practices. The production function is thus specified as follows: 






β3ε , where x1  is a composite input representing crop-
specific variable inputs. It includes direct inputs such as seeds, fertilizers and crop 
protection inputs. Variable    x2  is another composite input representing other crop-specific 
direct inputs such as energy and water. Variable z1  represents labor, which is considered 
a quasi-fixed input. Following Just and Pope (1978), parameters of the output mean and 
variance functions are estimated by maximum likelihood procedures, being 
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function.  
  It is assumed that farmers’ preferences can be represented by Saha’s (1997) 
flexible utility function  u=W
θ −σW
γ , where θ > 0 and γ  are parameters. Under this      13





γ −1, an 
expression that can accommodate different risk attitudes. Risk aversion (neutrality) 
[affinity] corresponds to  γ > (=)[<]0. Under the assumption of risk aversion,
4 decreasing 
(constant) [increasing] absolute risk aversion preferences involve  θ > (=)[<]1. 
Additionally, decreasing (constant) [increasing] relative risk aversion is denoted by 
 θ > (=)[<]γ . By omitting the superscript  I , the system of first-order conditions can now 
be expressed as follows for both organic and conventional farms: 
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=0 with    j =1,.., J . The 
system of equations with known technology parameters is estimated by full information 
maximum likelihood techniques in order to derive estimates for the risk-preference 
parameters. 
Spain as a Producer of Organic Arable Crops 
Interest in organic agriculture in the EU has caused a relevant increase in the organic area 
since the 1990s (from 0.7 million hectares in 1993 to 5.1 million in 2003).
5 The EU 
accounts for a large proportion of the worldwide organic area. In 2003, the European 
continent represented 23.2% of the world organic land (21.8% if we focus on the EU), 
ranking third behind Oceania (43.2%) and Latin America (23.7%). Europe was followed 
by North America (5.7%), Asia (2.7%), and Africa (1.5%).  
Spain occupies a prominent position in the EU-15 ranking of organically grown 
area. Together with Germany, it is the EU-15’s second largest producer (with about 0.7      14
million hectares in 2003) after Italy (that devotes around 1 million hectares to organic 
farming). Our analysis focuses on Spain, thus studying the situation of one of the most 
relevant organic crop producers within the EU. As is the case with Europe, the Spanish 
organic area has also experienced a spectacular growth during the last decades, from 11.6 
thousand hectares in 1993 to 725.2 by 2003. The latter figure represents almost 3% of the 
Spanish utilized agricultural area (UAA), a figure still below the EU-15 average (4% in 
2003). The expansion in organic areas has somewhat slowed down during the 2000 
decade relative to the growth registered throughout the 1990s. The number of organic 
holdings has also experienced an important increase both in the EU and in Spain. While 
in 1993 Spain had 753 organic holdings, the figure increased to 17,028 in 2003, the latter 
representing about 12% of EU’s organic producers. The number of Spanish organic 
agricultural holdings reached a maximum in 2003, experiencing a slight decline 
thereafter. As is the case with the EU, the average size of Spanish organic holdings 
(slightly above 40 hectares) is considerably larger than the conventional farms’ average 
UAA (which was a little above 20 hectares in 2003).  
  Of the 2003 EU-15 organic area, 61% was devoted to grassland and fodder crops, 
25% to arable crops, while horticulture and other crops represented 8% and 6%, 
respectively.
6 Hence, almost 65% of the organic crop area was planted with arable crops, 
with cereals representing the most important commodity and occupying 70% of the 
organic arable area. Spain was third in the EU-15 ranking of organic arable crop 
production after Germany and Italy. With 0.16 million hectares, Spain concentrated about 
12% of the EU-15’s organic arable crop surface. As is the case with Europe, arable crops 
represent the most relevant organic crop in Spain (half of the Spanish organic crop area).      15
Olive groves and dried fruits follow arable crops in the distribution of the organic area by 
crop type. Given the relevance of Spain in the EU production of organic arable crops, as 
well as the importance of these crops both within the EU and Spanish organic area, our 
analysis focuses on a sample of Spanish farms specialized in the production of cereals, 
oilseeds, and protein (COP) crops.   
Empirical Application 
Farm-level data are taken from the Eurostat Farm Accounting Data Network (FADN) for 
the period 2001 to 2003. It is important to note that FADN dataset is an incomplete panel 
of data that does not allow tracking an individual farm over time. As a result and as noted 
above, our assessment of the decision to adopt will be based on a simulation exercise. 
The sample is composed by 3,643 observations that produce under conventional systems 
and by 68 observations that operate using organic practices. Although the analysis is 
based on farm-level data and since input prices are unavailable from FADN, we use 
country-level input price indices.
7 These indices are taken from Eurostat’s New Cronos 
Database. As noted above, three inputs (two variable and a quasi-fixed input) are defined. 
Table 1 contains summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis. Variable input 
   x1  is a composite input expressed as an implicit quantity index, i.e., it is defined as the 
ratio of input use per hectare in currency units to its corresponding price index. It 
includes the use of seeds, fertilizers, and crop protection products. Other crop-specific 
direct inputs such as water or energy are comprised in x2 , which is also defined as an 
implicit quantity index. Variable z1  represents labor considered as a quasi-fixed input 
and measured in hours per hectare. Output  y , measured in tons per hectare, aggregates      16
the production of COP crops.
8 The output price is approximated at the farm-level through 
the ratio of farm-level COP sales expressed in constant currency units to farm-level COP 
production (in physical units). Initial wealth is defined as a farm’s net worth, while 
government subsidies include Common Agricultural Policy subsidies to arable crops (   S1) 
and environmental subsidies (   S2).
 As is well known, EU agri-environmental subsidies 
provide for payments to farmers in return for carrying out agri-environmental 
commitments. Farmers are paid for the cost of implementing these commitments as well 
as for any losses in income that these commitments might entail. In Spain, however, these 
measures are relatively unimportant compared to other EU countries (Commission of the 
European Communities 2005). 
Results  
Table 1 shows that organic farms have per hectare yields that are slightly above 
conventional yields.
9 Table 1 also shows that in order to achieve these yields, organic 
farms incur higher input costs per hectare relative to conventional holdings. However, a 
word of caution should be offered here since a direct comparison between organic and 
conventional input costs cannot be made, as x1  and x2  not only differ in quantity but 
also in quality. Having said that, we should note that differences in input use probably 
suggest differences in the productive orientation between the two groups. An important 
segment of conventional Spanish COP farms consist of extensive dryland holdings with 
low added value and low input use. Conversely, our organic sample farms have higher 
gross margins per hectare and use land more intensively.
10 An example is the use of 
water. While conventional farms irrigate, on average, a 10% of their UAA, organic      17
holdings irrigate about 20% of their productive area. As noted above, an organic produce 
price premium that compensates any increase in production costs is likely to cause an 
increase in organic farms’ yields relative to their conventional counterparts. Table 1 
shows that organic farms receive a price premium for their produce of about 30% relative 
to conventional holdings. From table 1, it can also be inferred that organic farms have per 
hectare gross margins that are about a 31% higher than conventional profits. Subsidies 
among the two groups also differ, with organic farms receiving higher COP 
compensatory payments per hectare, which is the result of these farms producing 
relatively more high-subsidy crops such as oilseeds and protein crops. As expected, 
environmental subsidies per hectare are also higher for organic farms.  
  Parameter estimates for the production function (table 2) show that both organic 
and conventional technologies are characterized by (short-run) decreasing returns to 
scale. The higher levels of input use by organic farms results in lower output elasticities 
for direct inputs (seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides) relative to conventional farms.
11 
However, the output elasticity for x2  is substantially higher in organic farms, which is 
very likely to be due to the higher use of irrigation technologies by these farms. 
Parameter estimates for the stochastic component of production show that input use by 
organic farms is essentially risk increasing independently of the type of input. Hence, for 
this group of farms, input use contributes to increased production in already good states 
of nature. Conventional farms’ inputs behave similarly with the exception of other direct 
inputs such as water that are found to reduce risk. This latter result is not surprising. 
Conventional farms are not likely to suffer from pest problems. In such a scenario, the 
use of irrigation technologies is expected to reduce output variability. Irrigation, however,      18
may increase production variance in those farms such as organic holdings with more 
difficulties to control pests. This leads to organic farms to bear relatively higher levels of 
output variability. Table 3 presents mean predicted values for the output mean and 
standard deviation, as well as the coefficient of variation of output. As can be seen, the 
coefficient of variation for organic farms is higher (0.8 versus 0.6), which means that 
organic farms are less capable of controlling risk relative to conventional holdings. 
  If organic farms are less capable of controlling for output variability, one should 
expect organic farmers to be less risk averse than their conventional counterparts. 
Parameter estimates for the risk-preference functions show that both conventional and 
organic farmers are risk averse  γ > 0 (table 2). There are, however, some differences 
between the two groups. As expected, since γ
C > γ
O, wealth variability reduces 
conventional farms’ utility quicker than organic farms’ utility. This suggests that some 
people may not adopt organic farming techniques unless some risk-reducing mechanisms 
are available in the market (this result is consistent with Chavas, 1994). Both groups 
exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) since θ >1. Our risk preference 
results, both for organic and conventional farms, are compatible with previous research 
(Isik and Khanna 2003; Saha, Shumway, and Talpaz 1994; or Bar-Shira, Just, and 
Zilberman 1997). However, it should be noted that contrary to conventional farms and as 
shown by the Wald test that  θ = γ =1 (table 2), organic farmers’ behavior is very close to 
a pattern of constant absolute and relative risk aversion (CARA and CRRA). These 
differences might be explained by the fact that organic farmers in our sample are 
wealthier than conventional growers (see table 1), which may make them more willing to 
assume more risk. Thus, for our sample of farms, organic farming seems to be an      19
alternative mainly benefiting wealthier farmers rather than small poor ones. This is 
compatible with recent trends in the organic sector both in the EU and in the United 
States, characterized by a decline in the number of small and medium-sized family-
operated organic farms that have been progressively replaced by big farms as 
corporations, attracted by the economic potential of the organic market niche, have 
entered the business (see, for example, Guthman, 2004 and Just and Zilberman 1983). 
  As explained in the introduction, in order to assess farmers’ decision to adopt 
organic farming, we compare, in a simulation exercise, the expected utility under organic 
and conventional farming under different economic scenarios. Specifically, we compute 
the number of conventional farms that would be willing to go organic at different levels 
of organic produce price premiums and environmental subsidies. To do so, we select the 
year 2003 as the benchmark, and numerically solve the system of first-order conditions 
for conventional farms and compute optimal utility levels. We then compute the optimal 
under the assumption that the same group of farms operates with the organic technology 
and compare utility levels under different economic scenarios to determine the rate of 
adoption ( V
O >V
C). It is important to note that ours is a very simplified exercise that 
compares utility levels before and after adoption, but that does not consider the costs of 
adoption which are not observed. Also, our analysis ignores, as a result of a lack of 
information, possible constraints affecting adoption such as a shortage of organic inputs. 
In this regard, our estimates should be interpreted very carefully and should not be 
extrapolated beyond a simple comparison of utility levels derived from organic and 
conventional techniques. In a scenario where there are no adoption costs, table 4 shows 
that a price premium of 40% is found to lead adoption of about 43% of the farms, while a      20
90% premium may trigger the adoption of nearly all conventional farms. This result is 
compatible with previous research that shows that synthetic pesticide banning is likely to 
result in an increase in food prices (see Zilberman et al. 1991) and a decrease in 
consumers’ economic welfare. For comparison purposes, we also study differential 
values of organic and conventional practices under the assumption of certainty and risk 
neutrality. We expect risk-neutral producers to adopt at a quicker path relative to risk- 
averse agents. An increase in output price will increase both the wealth mean and 
variance. While risk-neutral farmers will only consider the improvement in the expected 
wealth (profit), risk-averse agents will take into account both the increase in wealth mean 
and variance. This will cause the latter group to adopt more slowly. It should be noted 
though that while the output coefficient of variation is quite high for both conventional 
and organic farms, the coefficient of variation of wealth is considerably smaller for both 
technologies.
12 Since relative risk is small, we do not expect very big differences between 
risk-neutral and risk-averse adoption paths. As expected, table 4 shows that adoption is 
quicker under the risk-neutrality hypothesis. For example, while a price premium on the 
order of 40% motivates the adoption of 43% of the farmers under a risk-averse scenario, 
it yields cumulative adoption rates on the order of 56% in a risk-neutral environment. 
Differences fade away for high price premiums motivating the adoption of almost the 
whole sample under both scenarios.  
The same exercise is repeated for different levels of environmental subsidies. Our 
results show that current environmental subsidies are too low to induce, by themselves, a 
significant number of farms to convert. As it has been noted before, agri-environmental 
subsidies are very low in Spain compared to the EU-15 aid levels. According to the      21
Commission of the European Communities (2005), EU-15’s average premium for 
organic or in-conversion land is around 180 € per hectare, while the average agri-
environmental premium is on the order of 90 €. We analyze adoption for these as well as 
for other subsidy levels around EU-15 averages. In table 4 one can see that a 90 € subsidy 
could trigger the conversion of about 5% of the farms, while a payment of 180 € may 
induce the conversion of 28% of the farms. Increasing the subsidy to 225 € may allow 
cumulative adoption rates of about 51%. As noted above, consideration of adoption costs 
and possible adoption constraints is very likely to yield more conservative estimates of 
the rates of adoption than the ones derived. We now compare differential values of 
organic and conventional practices under a risk-averse and a risk-neutral scenario with 
different levels of subsidies. An environmental subsidy will increase the expected profit 
without altering its variance. The improvement in the profit mean will not only increase 
DARA farmers’ expected rents, but it will also reduce their aversion to risk. To the extent 
that the latter effect is big enough to compensate for the wealth risk, DARA farmers 
could display higher adoption rates than risk-neutral ones. As expected, our results show 
that for subsidy levels greater than 135 €, adoption is quicker in the risk- averse scenario, 
being slower below this level. Our results which can only be applied to our sample of 
Spanish farms, are in accord with Isik and Khanna’s (2003) findings, which suggest 
uncertainties and risk aversion as a possible cause to explain the low observed adoption 
rates of precision farming technologies. They are also compatible with the results derived 
by Marra and Carlson (1990) or Brink and McCarl (1978) that risk aversion reduces the 
adoption of double-cropping systems. 
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Concluding Remarks 
The literature comparing organic and nonorganic farming has identified several factors 
that affect the decision to go organic. However, to our knowledge, the role of differences 
in risk and risk attitudes has not been investigated. Given the potential control over 
production variability that can be exercised with the use of inputs and given the 
differences in input use between conventional and organic farms, one should explicitly 
allow for risk differentials between the two practices, and these differentials may also be 
associated with different attitudes toward risk. We use a model of farmer decision-
making under risk to analyze the differential values between Spanish COP organic and 
conventional farms and to assess the incentives for adoption of organic practices.  
  Results show that organic and conventional farms do have different abilities to 
control production risk, which lead to organic farms to bear higher production risks. As 
for risk preferences, both groups are found to display DARA preferences, though organic 
farms are found to be closer to CARA) and CRRA) preferences than conventional ones. 
Differences in risk preferences involving that wealth variability reduces conventional 
farmers’ utility quicker than organic farmers’ utility and may explain why wealthier 
farmers in our sample are more willing to adopt organic methods. We then simulate the 
conventional farms’ adoption path at different levels of organic produce price premiums 
and environmental subsidies in a scenario where adoption costs and restrictions are 
assumed to be zero. Prices are found to be a powerful instrument to motivate adoption, 
with price premiums on the order of 50% triggering the adoption of about 82% of the 
sample. Environmental subsidies at current levels are not a significant economic 
motivation. However, if Spanish farms were to receive EU-average subsidy levels, this      23
could motivate the adoption of a substantial number of farms. Obviously, our study 
should be interpreted with care since we do not observe adoption costs. Observation and 
consideration of these costs are very likely to yield much more conservative estimates 
than the ones derived. Our simulation results also show that different uncertainties and 
risk preferences between organic and conventional farms have differential impacts on the 
adoption rates relative to a risk-neutral scenario. Specifically, we find risk aversion to 
reduce the adoption of organic farming systems, which is compatible with previous 
research results. The results suggest that insurance schemes may be useful mechanisms to 
induce the adoption of organic farming, given the higher risk it entails and the lower risk 
aversion of early adopters. This idea is consistent with Carlson (1979) or Smith and 
Goodwin (1996) who claim that crop insurance is likely to reduce pesticide use (a claim 
debated by Horowitz and Lichtenberg, 1993). Suggesting that insurance schemes 
protecting organic growers will induce adoption of organic systems does not imply that 
these schemes are necessarily efficient. Thus, studies on such schemes and their 
implications are subjects for future research.      24
Footnotes 
 
1 The organic produce policy in the EU emerged in the early 1990s with the adoption of 
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2092/91. The Regulation was the culmination of the 
recognition process of organic farming by certain Member States and the growing 
demand from European consumers. The legal framework set up by the EU is part of a 
wider policy on quality for agricultural products.  
2 It is relevant to note that our analysis compares conventional farms versus organic farms 
once the latter has undergone the official conversion period. Data on adoption costs, 
which include lack of access to full price premiums during the conversion process, 
information and experience gathering, etc. (see Lampkin, Measures, and Padel 2002), are 
unavailable. As a result, our analysis assumes that adoption costs have been supported 
and covered exclusively during the transition period which we do not consider.  
3 It could also be the case that organic farms have less ability to control production risk 
relative to their conventional counterparts. Under this scenario, the increase in input use 
may also be compatible with higher output variability. 
4 A number of previous studies that have tested for economic agents’ risk preferences 
have provided evidence in favor of risk aversion (see Isik and Khanna 2003; Saha 1997; 
or Bar-Shira, Just, and Zilberman 1997). 
5 Data presented in this section are obtained from the Spanish Ministry for Agriculture 
(2005) and the Commission of the European Communities (2005). 
6 This breakdown of organic area by crop type contrasts with other countries’ distribution 
such as the United States, whose organic pasture and rangeland represented only 34% of      25
 
total organic area in 2003, while cropland accounted for 66% of the total (National 
Agricultural Statistics Service). 
7 We do not observe differential input price indices between organic and conventional 
farms since a single average price index is available. A sensitivity analysis was carried 
out to determine how results would change if organic input price indices differed from 
average (conventional) ones. No substantial changes were appreciated (results are not 
presented here but are available from the authors upon request). 
8 Davis, Lin, and Shumway (2000) extend the generalized composite commodity theorem 
and provide support for consistent aggregation of agricultural production in the United 
States into as few as two categories: crops and livestock. 
9 As explained above,  y  is an aggregate output measure that includes the production of 
COP. A crop-by- crop comparison of organic and conventional yields suggests that, with 
the exception of wheat and barley, organic yields are higher. 
10 According to FADN, the average economic size of our conventional sample farms is 
510 european size units (ESU) per hectare, while the same measure reaches 806 ESU for 
organic holdings.  
11 A test was conducted to determine whether production parameters were statistically 
different between conventional and organic farms. With the exception of  3 α , parameters 
were found to be statistically different.  
12 At the data means, the wealth coefficient of variation is 0.05 for organic and 0.07 for 
conventional farms. The lower coefficient of variation faced by organic farms is due to 
higher wealth levels held by these farms.       26
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for the Variables of Interest 








n = 68 
Standard 
Deviation 
 y  (in €/ha)  3.73  2.75 4.01 3.36 
 p (in €/ha)  129.63  48.28 172.65  55.75 
   x1  (in €/ha)  135.06   107.94 239.06 220.08 
   w1 (price index)  1.04 0.01  1.03  0.01 
   x2  (in €/ha)  118.40  120.45 151.31  82.03 
   w2 (price index)  1.02 0.03  1.00  0.02 
   z1  (in hours/ha) 46.22 54.61  59.74  63.40 
   S1 (in €/ha)  225.25  108.43 394.91 200.66 
   S2 (in €/ha)  1.46  10.30 7.15  22.11 
   W0 ( in €/ha)  3,566.61  4,005.62 8,636.74 7,667.42 
Note: all monetary values are expressed in constant 2000 currency units. 
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Table 2. Parameter Estimates for the Production Technology and Risk Preferences 











 α0  0.163** 
0.011 0.068**  0.036 
 α1  0.528** 
0.018 0.234**  0.099 
 α2  0.006 
0.016 0.463**  0.151 
 α3  0.154** 
0.013 0.136*  0.100 
 β0  0.685** 
0.079 0.027*  0.019 
 β1  0.329** 
0.040 0.227**  0.134 
 β2  -0.445** 
0.041 0.556*  0.347 
 β3  0.608** 
0.035 0.483**  0.191 
θ   1.293**  0.011 1.140**  0.058 
γ   1.500**  0.011 1.115**  0.078 
   Ho: θ = γ =1  111,946.000  Pval <0.001  3.93  Pval =0.060 
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Table 3. Estimates for the Output Mean and Variability 











 f   3.716**  1.843 4.047**  2.243 
 g   1.937** 0.513  3.012**  1.390 
 CV   0.592** 0.215  0.809**  0.162 
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Table 4. Cumulative Conversion Rates (in %) under  
a Risk-Averse and a Risk- Neutral Scenario 
Change in Output Price 
Price increase in %  Risk Averse Risk Neutral
10 0.7  1.1 
20 4.3  5.9 
30 16.4  21.5 
40 43.2  55.8 
50 82.2  86.8 
60 90.9  91.7 
70 94.0  94.3 
80 95.6  96.1 
90 96.2  96.7 
100 96.8  97.1 
Change in Direct Subsidies 
Subsidy in € per ha  Risk Averse Risk Neutral
0 0.3  0.4 
45 1.2  3.2 
90 5.0  6.4 
135 10.6  10.6 
180 27.3  20.8 
225 51.3  43.3 
 